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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

ALBERT PHAREZ ASHBURN,
Plaintiff/Respondent
VS.
:ase No:

MARIELA UYOMBE ASHBURN,

900386 CA

Priority Classification: 16

Defendant/Appellant

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction to hear this appeal is conferred upon this
Court by Section 78-2a-3 (2) (h), Utah Code Annotated, as
amended, which gives the Utah Court of Appeals appellate
jurisdiction over appeals from district courts involving
divorce, property division and support.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
STANDARD OF REVIEW
!•

Did the Trial Court abuse its discretion in awarding

Defendant alimony in the amount of only $40 0 per month which was
to terminate nine months later?
2.

Should the duration of an alimony award depend upon

the length of the marriage?
3.

Did the Trial Court abuse its discretion in requiring

Defendant to pay her own medical insurance premiums beginning
August 1, 1990?
For all three issues, the standard of review is as follows:

1

The trial court's factual findings are presumed correct
and, unless they are shown to be "clearly erroneous" under Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure 52 (a) , they will not be set aside on
appeal.

Smith v. Smith, 793 P.2d 407, 409 (Utah App. 1990).

However, a trial court's conclusions of law are examined for
correctness and are accorded no special deference on review. Id.
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES
Section 30-3-5- (1), Utah Code Annotated, as amended:
When a decree of divorce is rendered, the court may
include in it equitable orders relating to the children,
property, and parties . . .
Section 30-3-5- (3), Utah Code Annotated, as amended:
The court has continuing jurisdiction to make
subsequent changes or new orders for the support and maintenance
of the parties, . . . .
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
1.

Nature of the Case. This is an appeal from a final

judgment of a decree of divorce and related relief, and
specifically, from the adequacy of the alimony award.
2.

Course of the Proceedings.

Plaintiff filed a

Complaint seeking a divorce from Defendant in Weber County
District Court on April 19, 1989.

Defendant filed an Answer on

August 14, 1989, a Counterclaim on August 22, 1989 and issued a
Request for Production of Documents.

Plaintiff issued

Interrogatories and Request for Production of Documents on
August 18, 1989 and filed a Reply on August 25, 1990.
trial was held on November 13, 1989.

A pre-

Defendant's counsel

withdrew on November 24, 1989 after filing an Objection to the
Commissioner's Recommendations.

On November 27, 1990,
2

Defendant's new counsel filed an Objection to Pre-Trial
Recommendations and the matter was set for trial on March 27,
1990 before the Honorable Stanton M. Taylor.
3.

Disposition at Trial Court.

The Decree of Divorce

was entered on May 17, 1990 awarding Defendant $400.00 per month
alimony terminating on December 31, 1990 and medical insurance
coverage through Plaintiff's employer, terminating on.July 31,
1990.
4.

Statement of Facts.

The parties married in Las Vegas

in September, 1985, after living together for approximately one
year (Tr., at 73).

No children were born of the six year

relationship and Defendant obtained a Decree of Separate
Maintenance on July 29, 1987, awarding her $400.00 per month for
three years and requiring Plaintiff to maintain her on his
employer's health, accident, and dental insurance plan, pursuant
to the provisions of the federal statute, COBRA (Tr.,at 14, 2327 & 120). However, the parties never separated, they remained
together while Defendant pursued an education (Tr., at 22-23).
At the time of trial, Defendant was a 41 year old native of
Equatorial Guinea, Africa, who first came to this country 27
years ago at the age of about 14 years (Tr., at 16 & 78).

This

was the third marriage for Defendant who has two grown children
from her first marriage and has worked very little outside the
home, the last time being approximately fifteen years ago (Tr.,
at 15, 75 Sc 81) . Defendant has a fourth grade education in her
native language, Spanish, is illiterate in English, and has a

3

very difficult time being understood when she speaks English
(Tr., at 77-80).
Defendant has always been totally dependant on others for
support:

First married at age 14 and divorced 15 years later

(Tr., at 95-96), she totally relied on her husbands for support,
then her son after her second divorce (Tr., at 75-81).

During

her marriages, Defendant did not work because her husbands
required her to stay at home (Tr., at 81). When she did briefly
work, Defendant worked as a domestic and also as a mail opener
(Tr., at 80-81).
Defendant has taught herself much of what she needs to know
to get along by memorizing words and numbers and by learning how
to take tests (Tr., at 80; Tr. Exhibit 2D). So far she has used
her ability to memorize very well in progressing toward her goal
of obtaining literacy in the English language by earning a high
school diploma and taking a English language course at Weber
State College (Tr., at 15 & 79).

At Weber State College,

Defendant, who spoke Pidgin English, could not keep up with the
class (Tr., at 79).

Plaintiff, a Computer Scientist, is well

educated, having a Master's Degree from Hampton University (Tr.,
at 15 & 17).
Prior to her relationship with and marriage to Plaintiff,
Defendant lived with her daughter in Utah, then her son in
California in a condo given to them by Defendant's first husband
(Tr., at

75). Three days before she married Plaintiff,

Defendant quit-claimed her share of this condo to her son and
daughter because Plaintiff did not want to be responsible for

4

payments (Tr., at 19, 83, 97-100 ). At that time, Defendant
also owned a car, a lot in the California desert and personal
clothing and jewelry (Tr., at 83,91-92).
Defendant entered into the marriage with Plaintiff on the
basis of representations made by him which induced her to marry,
namely that he would support her, care for her, and send her to
school in the same way that her son was going to do (Tr., at
76).

Even though she loved him, Defendant did not want to marry

Plaintiff because she thought he would become ashamed of her
because of her lack of education (Tr., at 75).

She explained to

Plaintiff that she had always wanted to go to school to gain
something for herself because her first two husbands wanted her
to be a housewife

(Tr., at 75-76).

Plaintiff, convincing her

that he would take care of her desires and needs, traveled to
California to bring her to Utah, stopping in Las Vegas to marry
(Tr., at 43 & 76).

While not exactly denying that he promised

her these things - "I said to her . . . whatever she asked me to
say," he does admit that he encouraged her to go to school (Tr.,
at 44).
During her relationship with Plaintiff, Defendant suffered
emotional and physical turmoil.

Six weeks after the marriage,

Defendant discovered that the representations concerning the
marriage would and could never be fulfilled because plaintiff
admitted to her that he was a homosexual and that he had had a
relationship with another man (Tr., at 77).

Even though both

parties have tested negatively for AIDS, defendant lives in fear
that a later test will reveal that she has indeed contacted the
5

disease (Tr., at 54, & 89 -90). In addition, physical problems
acquired during the marriage prevent her from employment similar
to which she undertook fifteen years ago (Tr., at 81). She has
injuries to her arm, head and chest as a result of physical
abuse inflicted on her by Plaintiff which causes her much pain
and a continuing need for medical care (Tr., at 49 & 81-82).
Defendant has gone to the Women's Crises Center in Ogden for
help (Tr., at 82) and subsequent counseling by a social worker
employed by the State of Utah, Social Service Administration as
a direct result of the physical abuse inflicted by Plaintiff
(Tr., at 32 and 69-70).

Even though Plaintiff has denied that

he caused her injuries, he has admitted hitting her (Tr., at
32).

Also, he has stated that another time, while they were

arguing, she somehow "backed up and fell" when he turned around
to face her (Tr., at 62). In addition to the physical abuse,
Defendant endured the last of her four abortions during her
relationship with Plaintiff, at his direction, one year before
the trial, a further indication of the emotional turmoil she
encountered (Tr., at 85 and 88).
At the time of trial, Plaintiff earned $41,000 per year
with an annual Civil Service Retirement benefit accumulating at
the rate of $1,800 - 2,000 per year (Tr., at 17, 56 and 58; Tr.
Exhibit 3D). After considering the payments of support pursuant
to the Decree of Separate Maintenance, the trial court granted
defendant alimony in the amount of $400.00 per month terminating
on December 31, 1990, only nine months later (Tr., at 120;
Decree of Divorce #4, R., at 60). The trial court also ordered
6

Plaintiff to maintain and to pay for Defendant's medical
insurance coverage through July 31, 1990, when Defendant should
be responsible for the payment of such coverage (Decree of
Divorce #4, R., at 60). This order was entered despite
Defendant's testimony that she had no medical insurance (Tr., at
55 and 88). The trial court awarded Plaintiff all the assets of
the marriage including all of his retirement benefits, (Decree
of Divorce, #6, R., at 60), and any equity which would have
accumulated in the parties' home in Ogden during the six year
relationship (Tr., at 120). While it is true that Plaintiff was
ordered to pay the car payments for Defendant's car, (Decree of
Divorce, #3, R., at 59-60), the record shows that the court
intended this to be an offset against her share of his
retirement (Tr. at 120-121).

The trial court even awarded

Defendant her property in California despite her testimony that
she no longer had an interest in such property (Decree of
Divorce, #2, R., at 59; Tr., at 91).
Defendant presently receives a total income of $200 per
month (Tr., at 92 and 93). Her son is no longer able or willing
to support her or to pay for her schooling because he has other
obligations (Tr., at 105 and 106). Defendant no longer owns the
jewelry she had before the marriage because she sold it during
the marriage (Tr., at 91). In the past Defendant has had to
depend on friends for emotional and physical support and it is
submitted that she continues to temporarily depend on these
friends while resisting public assistance (Tr., at 105 - 107).
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When looking at her history, it becomes apparent that
Defendant never had the opportunity to develop the necessary
marketable job skills and, even Plaintiff agrees, the only
skills she is qualified to do involve physical labor or factory
work (Tr., at 44 & 77-81).

Defendant's inability to use the

English language effectively to communicate is also a serious
barrier.

Further complicating the situation is the fact that

Defendant is disabled due to injuries she received due to
Plaintiff's abuse during the parties' marriage (Tr., at 49 , 63,
81-82, and 104). Defendant desires to attend school in order to
obtain the necessary skills to become employable and independent
(Tr., at 106-107).

In order to do this she will continue to

need support and medical coverage from Plaintiff.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
1.

The trial court abused its discretion in awarding

Defendant alimony in the amount of only $400.00 per month and
for only nine months, in light of the following factors:

(1)

the financial condition and needs of the receiving spouse, (2)
the ability of the receiving spouse to produce sufficient income
for herself, and (3) the ability of the responding spouse to
provide support.

The trial court abused its discretion in this

case by not considering all three of the above factors nor did
it make adequate factual findings on material issues relating to
the issue of alimony.

Even if the trial court somehow

considered the above three factors, the award of alimony is such
a serious inequity that it becomes a clear abuse of discretion.
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Factors considered are what physical or mental disabilities
arising during the marriage, regardless of their cause, have
increased the need for alimony or have reduced a spouse's
ability to produce income.

Courts consider whether a spouse can

be returned to the status she had before marriage or if it is
likely that she could become a public charge.

If the record is

inadequate, the case can be remanded back to the trial court for
further factual findings on material issues.
2.

The duration of an alimony award should not depend

solely upon the length of the marriage but rather on what
changes occurred in a party's economic situation during the
marriage.

The court should consider such factors as what

economic adjustments were made which resulted in Defendant's
dependence and whether she can be returned to the status she had
before the marriage.

Trial courts retain the ability to

determine whether the alimony award has served its purpose.
3.

The trial court abused its discretion in not

considering Defendant's medical needs in awarding her alimony
and by requiring Plaintiff to maintain and to pay for her
medical insurance coverage only through July 31, 1990.

It is

important to consider the alimony award only after properly
distributing the property interests to the respective parties.
ARGUMENT
POINT ONE:

THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN
AWARDING ONLY $400.00 PER MONTH ALIMONY,
AND FOR ONLY NINE MONTHS.

A trial court's award of alimony is committed to the sound
discretion of that court, and it will not be disturbed absent a
9

clear abuse of discretion.
424 (Utah App. 1990) .

Haumont v. Hauirtont, 793 P.2d 421,

In setting an award of alimony, the trial

court must consider three factors:

(1)

the financial condition

and needs of the receiving spouse, (2) the ability of the
receiving spouse to produce sufficient income for herself, and
(3) the ability of the responding spouse to provide support.
Id.

The trial court is also required to make adequate factual

findings on all material issues when considering these factors.
Id.

If the trial court considers the above described factors in

setting an award of alimony, the award will not be disturbed
absent a showing that such a serious inequity has resulted as to
manifest a clear abuse of discretion.

Id.

If the trial court

fails to consider the three factors or fails to make adequate
factual findings on all material issues, the case will be
remanded to the trial court for the proper considerations unless
the facts in the record are clear, uncontroverted, and capable
of supporting only a finding in favor of the judgment.

Id.

Analyzed in light of the above requirements, the trial
court abused its discretion in this case by not considering all
three of the above factors and by not making adequate factual
findings on material issues relating to the issue of alimony.
Also, the relevant facts are unclear, controverted and do not
support a finding in favor of the judgment.

Even if this Court

finds that the trial court somehow considered all of the above
three factors and made the required findings on material issues,
the award of alimony is such a serious inequity that it becomes
a clear abuse of discretion.
10

1.

The Financial Conditions and Needs of the Receiving

Spouse,
Several Utah cases have addressed this first factor as an
important function of an alimony award and have held that there
must be adequate factual findings concerning the financial
condition and needs of the receiving spouse.

In Rusham V.

Rusham, 742 P.2d 123, 126 (Utah 1987), the trial court failed to
adequately address the financial needs of the receiving spouse.
The Supreme Court held that the trial court made inadequate
findings on the financial needs of the wife and abused its
discretion in awarding her only $600 per month alimony when
nothing in the record delineated her financial needs despite her
monthly expenses of $1,521.50. id.

The trial court found that

the wife was capable of earning $200.00 per month while her
husband's earnings were found to be $5,850.00.

The Supreme Court

held that, while equalization of income was not necessarily the
requirement, there must be some clear rationale for the level of
alimony consistent with the stated criteria.

Id. at 126.

There are no factual findings concerning the financial
condition and needs of Mrs. Ashburn in the present case - only
that she has "tremendous need" (Tr., at 120). As in Rusham, the
trial court here denied extended alimony based upon the short
term of the marriage in spite of her "tremendous need."

There

is no evidence in the record that the court's rationale for
awarding her $400.00 per month for only nine months was
consistent with her financial needs as mandated by Rusham.

The

evidence in the record, in fact, strongly suggests the contrary.
11

Defendant now receives a total of $20 0.00 per month income.
(Tr., at 93). While no evidence was presented at trial on her
expenses, it is obvious she will have difficulty supporting
herself.

The fact she remained living with Plaintiff after

going to the trouble of obtaining a Decree of Separate
Maintenance is proof of that (Tr., at 23).
In Noble v. Noble, 761 P.2d 1369 (Utah 1988), the Utah
Supreme Court upheld a permanent alimony award of $750.00 per
month to help meet the needs of the wife despite the fact that
the parties' marriage was only three years in duration.

The

court, in examining the financial condition and needs of the
wife, found that the disabilities Defendant suffered as a result
of her injuries at Plaintiff's hand should be an important
consideration in assessing the first two of the three factors.
The court also found that the wife may have suffered permanent
injuries that left her unemployable or unable to work at her
past level of experience and held that it was appropriate for
the trial court to take into account whether physical or mental
disabilities arising during the marriage, regardless of their
cause, have made the receiving party's needs greater or reduced
that party's ability to produce an income.

Noble at 1372.

The

facts in the Noble case involved the extreme case where the
husband attempted to murder his wife and to commit suicide and
failed in both.

However, the significance and importance of the

court's holding is that the duration of a marriage should not be
considered at all when the receiving party's ability to earn a
living has been reduced during the marriage, for whatever
12

reason.

Defendant has testified that her ability to handle work

requiring physical labor has been greatly impaired due to the
injuries in her her arm, elbow, head and chest (Tr., at 81-82).
Plaintiff even agrees that she has these injuries and that she
has sought medical help (Tr., at 49). Defendant has also
testified that she has sought medical help for these injuries
but there are no findings by the trial court that she is
disabled, that she is illiterate, or that she, in fact, could
work.

The relevant facts concerning her disability are either

lacking completely or they are unclear and controverted and they
do not support a finding in favor of the judgment.
Bovle v. Bovle, 735 P.2d 669, 671 (Utah App. 1987),
addresses the issue of alimony in a second marriage.

The trial

court awarded no alimony after a seven-year marriage and the
Court of Appeals affirmed its decision because the decree entered
by the trial court restored each party to the condition which
existed at the time of the marriage.

Id. at 671.

The Court,

looking at the issue of whether the trial court's award can place
a spouse back into the position occupied prior to the marriage,
held that the wife could support herself.

This was found

impossible in Noble.
In the present case, Defendant cannot be returned to the
position occupied prior to the marriage.

Defendant is disabled

due to the injuries she sustained during the marriage.

While the

evidence regarding her disability is controverted, a review of
the testimony of both parties leaves no doubt that she sustained
injuries during the marriage and was in a better position before
13

marriage then she is in now.

Before marrying Plaintiff, she had

the support from her son and his intention to educate her, but
she no longer can depend upon this support (Tr., at 105-106).

In

addition, Defendant owned land in the California Mojave desert
and an interest in a condominium in California which she does not
have now (Tr., at 90-91).

Even though Defendant was awarded her

car and her personal clothing (Tr., at 91), she has suffered
economic losses.

Because her car was destroyed by Plaintiff in

an accident, (Tr., at 83-84), the court, by requiring Plaintiff
to make payments on a new one, simply restored her separate
property to her.

But she paid dearly for this for the court

considered the car payments an offset against Plaintiff's
retirement.

Even though Defendant was not working when she

married Plaintiff, nor did she work during the marriage,
Plaintiff knew of her background, her lack of ability to
communicate and her illiteracy (Tr., at 73-74).

But he convinced

her to marry him, anyway, with Defendant believing that he would
educate her and care for her.
2.

The Ability of the Wife to Produce a Sufficient Income

for Herself.
The trial court in the present case made no findings on
Mrs. Ashburn's ability to produce a sufficient income to support
herself, nor do the relevant facts support such a finding.
The Utah Court of Appeals has held that the denial of
alimony was a clear abuse of discretion where the record does
not reveal that the court considered or made any finding of the
wife's current or future ability to work.
14

Canning v. Canning,

744 P.2d 325, 32.6 (Utah App. 1987).

In Canning, the Court held

that the decree, while appearing to contemplate that the wife
would obtain work and earn income sufficient to support herself
and

the parties' children, there were no specific

findings to that effect.

Id. at 327.

factual

Without specific factual

findings, she would be left without a baseline for

future

modification purposes if she does not in fact obtain ongoing,
income-producing work.

Id.

In Hialev v. Hialev, 676 P. 2d 379 (Utah 1983), the Court
examined the economic situation facing the parties, particularly
women emerging from a marriage who earn approximately 60 percent
of what men earn.

Because the trial court made no findings

regarding the receiving spouses' ability to work in the present
as well as in the future and, because of health problems that
appeared to greatly restrict her ability to work, the Supreme
Court held that an award of $100 per month permanent alimony was
a clear and prejudicial abuse of discretion.

Hiqlev at 381.

The appellant in Hiqlev was a 47 year old woman with a high
school education who was in poor health and who had spent most
of the last 3 0 years of her life as a full-time homemaker and
caretaker of her children.

Id at 381.

The court found that

Appellant could well be forced to resort to public assistance as
the trial court's award of $100 per month alimony fell far short
of serving her needs.
Likewise, in the instant case, Defendant has spent nearly
all of her life as a full-time homemaker and caretaker of her
children at the consent and requirement of her husbands.
15

She

only worked for a short time and is now left with only $200.00
per month income, an inability to communicate in the English
language, and with a physical disability.

This could force her

to seek public assistance as her income falls far short of
meeting her needs.

Defendant cannot be expected to rely on any

assets acquired during the marriage because she has none of
these, not even a fair share of Plaintiff's retirement.
Courts have awarded alimony when it was found that the wife
could be forced to seek public assistance.

In English v.

English, 565 P.2d 409, 411 (Utah 1977), the Supreme Court held
that the most important function of alimony is to provide
support for the wife as nearly as possible at the standard of
living she enjoyed during the marriage, and to prevent her from
becoming a public charge.

The trial court observed in Sampinos

v. Samioinos, 750 P.2d 615, 619 (Utah App. 1988):

". . . The

trial court's allocation of alimony was an attempt to keep
plaintiff from becoming a public charge and to realign the
disparity between the defendant's and plaintiff's standards of
living."

In Sampinos, the Court of Appeals held that alimony

should be paid based on the needs of the wife and her ability to
produce income for herself.
Thus, the alimony award of $400.00 per month, in the
present case, constituted an abuse of discretion.

It was

inequitable and unfair, also, as to its short duration.

There

were no specific factual findings as to whether Defendant could
or would obtain work and earn income sufficient to support
herself or if she could become a public charge.
16

The evidence

shows that she did not work prior to the marriage or during the
marriage because Plaintiff did not want, nor expected her to
work.

There was no evidence presented that Defendant would have

a job when the alimony terminated or that she could be selfsupporting at that time only, apparently, the trial court's
assumption.

As noted in Olson v. Olson, 704 P.2d 564, 567.(Utah

1985) :
. . . Having worked only minor clerical jobs for two
brief periods over twenty years apart she has no
reasonable expectation of obtaining employment two
years hence that will enable her to support herself
at a standard of living even approaching that which
she had during

the marriage.

Continuing

spousal

maintenance is mandated by these circumstances . .
should the circumstances change in the future, the
defendant may petition

the court

to modify

the

decree under its continuing jurisdiction.
3.

The Ability of the Husband to Provide Support.

The

trial court recognized that Plaintiff has the ability to pay
alimony.

Plaintiff has a yearly income of $41,000 in addition

to retirement and savings.

Plaintiff offered no evidence of his

monthly expenses except the car payments (Tr., at 20). Further,
Plaintiff offered no evidence of the effect on his standard of
living of his paying $400.00 per month to Defendant.

Thus, the

trial court failed to adequately consider this third factor in
its award of alimony.

17

If the Record is adequate, this Court can modify the Decree
of Divorce or, if the record is not adequate, remand the case
back to the trial court for further findings and a resetting of
the alimony award based upon the required findings.
supra.

Haumont,

In Haumont, the Court of Appeals found that there was

substantial converted evidence as to the required three factors
which did not lend itself to a finding only in favor of the
judgment.

Id.

A review of the record in the present case suggests that
the trial court clearly abused its discretion by not making
adequate factual findings on material issues relating to
appellant's need for continuing support.

Also, the relevant

facts are unclear and controverted and do not support the
judgment which result in a serious inequity.

It is submitted

that much of this problem had to do with Defendant's lack of
ability to communicate to the court and to her counsel.
Defendant's desperate attempt to submit relevant evidence to the
court for reconsideration can be seen in her post trial filings
as recorded in the Index to the Record.
It is also important to consider that Plaintiff told
Defendant he would provide for her, never asked her to get a job
during their marriage and completely supported her even after
the Decree of Separate Maintenance was in effect.

Defendant

took Plaintiff at his word, that he would provide adequate
support for her while she went to school.

It is submitted that

the trial court ignored the real dynamics of the parties'
relationship, to-wit:

that Plaintiff, by his actions, lulled
18

Defendant into a false sense of security and then, when he filed
for the divorce before she had a chance to complete her
education, he pulled the rug out from under her.
POINT TWO:

THE DURATION OF AN ALIMONY AWARD SHOULD
NOT DEPEND UPON THE LENGTH OF THE MARRIAGE

In English v. English, supra, the findings of the trial
court as to its award of $2,000 per month alimony, as well as
$500 child support, was based upon the parties' twenty year
marriage and joint financial contributions.

The Utah Supreme

Court held that basing an award of alimony on the length of the
marriage as well as the financial contributions was not an
appropriate measure to determine alimony.

Id.

Likewise, in the

present case, the trial court clearly denied Mrs. Ashburn
extended alimony due to the length of the marriage despite her
tremendous need for it.
The trial court retains continuing jurisdiction in order to
terminate alimony under the provisions of Section 30-3--5 (3) of
the Utah Code which provides in part:
The Court has continuing jurisdiction to make
subsequent changes or new orders for the support and
maintenance of the parties . . . as is reasonable and
necessary.
In Anderson v. Anderson, 759 P.2d 476, 478 (Utah App.
1988), the Utah Court of Appeals held that it was not
appropriate to have alimony terminate on completion of education
or attainment of full-time employment but the matter should be
returned to the trial court to reconsider the alimony award in
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light of the completed education or full-time employment
commensurate to the three factors.

(See Haumont, supra.)

Thus, trial courts retain the ability to determine whether
or not the alimony award has served its purpose.

If the award

is rehabilitative in nature, it can be brought back to the Court
for further review in appropriate circumstances.
Lest Plaintiff point out that in many previous Utah
appellate decisions awarding permanent alimony such as Hialev v.
Hiqlev, supra; Olson v. Olson, supra; and Canning v. Canning,
supra; the marriages were of eighteen years duration or longer,
Defendant notes this Court's approval of permanent alimony
awards in short term marriages:

Noble v. Noble, supra,

(permanent alimony award after a three year marriage); Haumont
v. Haumont. supra, ( separation less than three years after
marriage, permanent alimony award given); Sampinos v. Sampinos,
supra, ( Permanent alimony award after an eleven year marriage
where the parties had separated four times for a total period of
more than four years) . Even though in Boyl^e, supra, at 671, the
Court held that consideration of the three factors does not
preclude considering factors such as the length of the marriage
in awarding alimony, the Boyle case can be distinguished from
the present one by its facts.

In Boyle, the trial court

properly considered the three necessary factors and the material
facts clearly supported the evidence where the wife was awarded
most of the marital estate as well as the residue of her
premarital assets.

Boyle, supra, at 671.
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Also, it was found

that the wife was able to continue to work as she had done prior
to the marriage.

Id. at 672.

In the present case, Defendant was awarded no assets of the
marriage, she had lost pre-marital assets, she did not work
prior to the marriage and her disability prevents her from
working at her only level of experience.

Also, the trial court

found that the marriage was over at the time of the Separate
Maintenance Decree and, therefore, it took into account the
amount paid to her under this Decree in awarding alimony even
though the parties were living together during that time.

This

resulted in a serious inequity and is an abuse of discretion.
POINT THREE:

THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN
FAILING TO CONSIDER APPELLANT'S NEED FOR
MEDICAL INSURANCE IN CONSIDERING THE
ALIMONY AWARD.

Injuries and attendant medical expenses may be considered
in determining an appropriate alimony award.

In Walther v.

Walther, 709 P.2d 387, 388 (Utah 1985), the Supreme Court held
that the trial court's award of $5,000 for pain, suffering, and
future medical expenses caused by the physical abuse of the
wife's husband could be considered in awarding alimony.

Id.

In the present case, there was no finding by the trial
court that Defendant could pay for her medical needs or for
insurance coverage nor did the award of alimony allow for these
needs.

There was only Defendant's

testimony

that she had

incurred medical expenses and will have future medical expenses.
It is appropriate for the trial court to consider

the

amount of alimony only after it properly distributes property
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interests to the respective parties.
1166, N.3

(Utah App. 1990).

Burt v. Burt, 799 P.2d

In the present case, the trial

court considered the amount paid to Defendant under the Decree
of Separate Maintenance in awarding the marital assets even
though the marriage was intact during

that time.

It also

considered the amount of the car payment of $237.73 per month
until November,

1992 to be an offset

against

Plaintiff's

retirement even though it was Plaintiff that wrecked the car
(Tr., at 120-121).

For these reasons the resulting award was

such a serious inequity that it is a clear abuse of discretion.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth herein, Defendant respectfully
prays that this Court modify the amount and duration of the
alimony award to permanent alimony, as argued above, and award
Defendant attorney fees incurred on this appeal.
Af

RESPECTFULLY submitted this

day of February, 1991.

CAROLYN D. ZEt^EH3Tl20
Attorney for AptellatLU/^efendant
2485 Grant AvenUe, Suite 200
Ogden, Utah 84401
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correct copies of the foregoing Brief of Appellant,, on this
'fust day of February, 1991 to:

C. Gerald Parker, Attorney for

Defendant, 2610 Washington Blvd., Ogden, Utah.
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DIVORCE

30-3-5

30-3-5. Disposition of property — Maintenance and health
care of parties and children — Court to have continuing jurisdiction — Custody and visitation —
Termination of alimony — Nonmeritorious petition for modification.
(1) When a decree of divorce is rendered, the court may include in it equitable orders relating to the children, property, and parties. The court shall
include the following in every decree of divorce:
(a) an order assigning responsibility for the payment of reasonable and
necessary medical and dental expenses of the dependent children; and
(b) if coverage is available at a reasonable cost, an order requiring the
purchase and maintenance of appropriate health, hospital, and dental
care insurance for the dependent children.
(2) The court may include, in an order determining child support, an order
assigning financial responsibility for all or a portion of child care expenses
incurred on behalf of the dependent children, necessitated by the employment
or training of the custodial parent. If the court determines that the circumstances are appropriate and that the dependent children would be adequately
cared for, it may include an order allowing the non-custodial parent to provide
the day care for the dependent children, necessitated by the employment or
training of the custodial parent.
(3) The court has continuing jurisdiction to make subsequent changes or
new orders for the support and maintenance of the parties, the custody of the
children and their support, maintenance, health, and dental care, or the distribution of the property as is reasonable and necessary.
(4) In determining visitation rights of parents, grandparents, and other
relatives, the court shall consider the welfare of the child.
(5) Unless a decree of divorce specifically provides otherwise, any order of
the court that a party pay alimony to a former spouse automatically terminates upon the remarriage of that former spouse. However, if the remarriage
is annulled and found to be void ab initio, payment of alimony shall resume if
the party paying alimony is made a party to the action of annulment and his
rights are determined.
(6) Any order of the court that a party pay alimony to a former spouse
terminates upon establishment by the party paying alimony that the former
spouse is residing with a person of the opposite sex. However, if it is further
established by the person receiving alimony that that relationship or association is without any sexual contact, payment of alimony shall resume.
(7) When a petition for modification of child custody or visitation provisions
of a court order is made and denied, the court may order the petitioner to pay
the reasonable attorney's fees expended by the prevailing party in that action,
if the court determines that the petition was without merit and not asserted in
good faith.
History: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, § 1212; L.
1909, ch. 109, § 4; C.L. 1917, § 3000; R.S.
1933 & C. 1943, 40-3-5; L. 1969, ch. 72, § 3;
1975, ch. 81, § 1; 1979, ch. 110, § 1; 1984, ch.
13, § 1; 1985, ch. 72, § 1; 1985, ch. 100, § 1.
Amendment Notes. — The 1985 amendment by Chapter 72 rewrote Subsection (1);

added Subsection (2); designated two undesignated paragraphs as Subsections (3) and (4);
inserted "In determining" and "the court" in
Subsection (4); redesignated former Subsections (2) and (3) as Subsections (5) and (6); divided Subsection (5) into two sentences, substituting "However, if the remarriage" for "unless
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C. Gerald Parker, #2520
PARKER, THORNLEY & CRITCHLOW
Attorneys for Plaintiff
2610 Washington Blvd.
P. 0. Box 107
Ogden, Utah 84402
Telephone: 399-3303
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
ALBERT PHAREZ ASHBURN,
826 North Liberty Avenue
Ogden, Utah 84404
SS No. 223-78-4987
Plaintiff,

JUDGMENT AND DECREE
OF DIVORCE

vs.
Civil No. 890902015DA
MARIELA UYOMBE ASHBURN,
Post Office Box 5128
Carson, California 90749
SS No. 331-36-6900
Defendant.

Judge:

Stanton M. Taylor

MAY 9 1990

The above-entitled action came on regularly for trial on
the 27th day of March, 1990, before the Honorable Stanton M.
Taylor, one of the Judges of the above-entitled Court sitting
without a jury.

The plaintiff appeared in person and was

represented by his counsel, C. Gerald Parker, and the defendant
appeared in person a^id was represented by her counsel, Phillip D.
Judd.

The Court fieard the evidence introduced on behalf of both

Indexed

plaintiff and defendant, and entered its Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law, pursuant to which a decree is to be entered;
now by virtue of the law and premises, in accordance with the facts
found and conclusions of law aforesaid, it is hereby
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED:
1.

That the bonds of matrimony now and heretofore

existing between the plaintiff and defendant be, and they are
hereby, dissolved and the parties be, and they are hereby, restored
to the status of unmarried persons on the date the divorce decree
is signed by the Court and entered by the Clerk in the Register of
Actions.
2.

That each of the parties is hereby awarded the assets

he or she owned prior to the marriage, free and clear of any claim
by the other.

Pursuant to this provision, plaintiff is therefore

awarded his home in Ogden, Utah, and defendant is awarded her real
estate situated in the State of California.

Plaintiff's home in

Ogden, Utah now stands of record in the names of ALBERT P. ASHBURN
and MARIELA U. ASHBURN and the legal description thereof is as
follows:
All of Lot 248, RON-CLARE VILLAGE NO. 3, Ogden
City, Weber County, Utah.
3.

That each of the parties is hereby awarded the assets

now in his or her possession.

Pursuant to this provision,

defendant is awarded the 1987 Honda Accord automobile and in

- 2-
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accordance with plaintiff's stated willingness to pay for this
vehicle, he is ordered to pay the balance owing thereon.

Plaintiff

also is ordered to pay the taxes and insurance on said vehicle
until the balance owing on said vehicle has been paid in full, at
which time he shall no longer be responsible to pay the taxes and
insurance thereon.
4.

That plaintiff is hereby ordered to continue to pay

the property settlement of $400.00 per month set forth in the
Separate Maintenance Decree through the month of July, 1990 and
commencing with the month of August, 1990, plaintiff is hereby
ordered to pay to defendant the sum of $400.00 per month as and for
alimony, to continue through December 31, 1990, at which time said
alimony shall terminate.
5.

That through the month of July, 1990, defendant shall

have the right to maintain medical insurance coverage through
plaintiff's insurer, pursuant to the provisions of the federal
COBRA statute, with plaintiff to pay the premiums thereon for that
period.

Should defendant elect to extend the said COBRA coverage

beyond July 31, 1990, she shall be responsible to pay all of the
premiums from that point forward.
6.

That plaintiff is hereby awarded all of his

retirement benefits and defendant is hereby awarded the $200.00 per
month retirement benefits she is receiving, pursuant to a former
marriage.

Recordedpfiofck^l * X _ |
Page

X.

* . " :

Indexed

7.

That defendant is hereby awarded judgment against

plaintiff for attorney's fees in the sum of $600.00.
8.

That defendant is hereby restored to her former
^

surname of MUNSON.
DATED this

H

day of ApriJL 1990.

St£nt
District
Approved as t o fojnua^d

content

P h i l l i p D. JucUT
Atrtorney—feir^ef endant
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:. Gerald Parker, #2520
PARKER, THORNLEY & CRITCHLOW
Attorneys for Plaintiff
2610 Washington Blvd.
P. 0. Box 107
Jgden, Utah 84402
Telephone:
399-3303
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
\LBERT PHAREZ ASHBURN.

)
)

Plaintiff,
vs .
'lARIELA

UYOMBE

ASHBURN,
Defendant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Civil No. 890902015DA
Judge:

Stanton M. Taylor

MAY 9 1990
The above-entitled action came on regularly for trial on
:he 27th day of March, 1990, before the Honorable Stanton M.
Taylor, one of the Judges of the above-entitled Court sitting
without a jury; the plaintiff appeared in person and was
represented by his counsel, C. Gerald Parker, and the defendant
ippeared in person and was represented by her counsel, Phillip D.
Judd.

The Court heard the evidence introduced on behalf of both

plaintiff and defendant, and after being fully advised in the
premises, now makes the following:

FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

That plaintiff is a bona fide and actual resident of

Weber County, Utah, and has been for more than three months
immediately prior to the commencement of this action.
2.

That plaintiff and defendant were married to each

other at Las Vegas, Nevada, on September 14, 1985, and ever since
said time have been and now are husband and wife.
3.

That no children have been born of this marriage and

none are expected.

Defendant has two adult children by a prior

marriage.
4.

That on July 29, 1987, a Decree of Separate

Maintenance was granted between the parties by the above-entitled
Court under Case No. 99795, which decree provided inter alia for
disposition of assets of the parties, the maintenance of medical
insurance, and the awarding to defendant of the sum of $400.00 per
month as a property settlement to continue for a period of three
years, commencing with the month of August, 1987.
5.

That the parties have irreconcilable differences

making further marital relationship impossible.
6.

That the parties have acquired assets, including the

following:
(a)

A home which plaintiff owned prior to the

marriage located at 826 North Liberty Avenue, Ogden, Utah.
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During the marriage, defendant's name was added to the
property and the home now stands of record in the names of
Albert P. and Marieia U. Ashburn.

The legal description

of said home is as follows:
All of Lot 248, RON-CLARE VILLAGE NO. 3? Ogden City,
Weber County, Utah.
(b)

Certain real property owned by defendant

situated in the State of California.
o
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(c)

A 1987 Honda Accord automobile.

(d)

Household furniture, furnishings and

(e)

Retirement benefits accrued by defendant

effects .

y
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through his employment at Hill Air Force Base and a
retirement benefit in the sum of $200.00 per month which

LU J
Q:

<
a.

defendant receives pursuant to a prior marriage.
(f)
7.

Personal effects.

That plaintiff is employed at Hill Air Force

Base wich an income of approximately $41,000.00 per year
gross and a net income of approximately $2,200.00 per
month.
8.

That defendant was not employed at the time

of her marriage to plaintiff and she has not been employed
since that time.
9.

That each of the parties have been
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represented by legal counsel in these proceedings and each
has incurred attorney's fees herein.
10.

That prior to this marriage, defendant was

known by the surname of MUNSON, by which surname she
desires to be known in the future.
From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court arrives at
the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
o

1.

x ir
O <
H- >

That plaintiff is entitled to a Decree of Divorce

from the defendant, the same to become final on the date the

0 O 3
m

Id
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divorce decree is signed by the Court and entered by the Clerk in
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the Register of Actions.
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2.

That each of the parties is hereby awarded the assets

of o

he or she owned prior to the marriage, free and clear of any claim
<
a,

by the other.

Pursuant to this provision, plaintiff is therefore

awarded his home in Ogden, Utah, and defendant is awarded her real
estate situated in the State of California.
3.

That each of the parties be awarded the assets now in

his or her possession.

Pursuant to this provision, defendant is

awarded the 1987 Honda Accord automobile and in accordance with
plaintiff's stated willingness to pay for this vehicle, he is
ordered to pay the balance owing thereon.

Plaintiff also is

ordered to pay the taxes and insurance on said vehicle until the
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balance owing on said vehicle has been paid in full, at which time
he shall no longer be responsible to pay the taxes and insurance
thereon.
4.

That plaintiff be required to continue to pay the

property settlement of $400.00 per month set forth in the
previously referenced Separate Maintenance Decree through the month
of July, 1990 and commencing with the month of August, 1990,
plaintiff shall be required to pay to defendant the sum of $400.00

I

per month as and for alimony, to continue through December 31,

g

> g
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1990, at which time said alimony shall terminate.
5.

T

o1zo .

That through the month of July, 1990, defendant shall

have the right to maintain medical insurance coverage through

S (3
a: o 0
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plaintiff's insurer, pursuant to the provisions of the federal
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COBRA statute, with plaintiff to pay the premiums thereon for that

i

period.

J H

Should defendant elect to extend the said COBRA coverage

beyond July 31, 1990, she shall be responsible to pay all of the
premiums from that point forward.
6.

That plaintiff be awarded all of his retirement

benefits and defendant be awarded the $200.00 per month retirement
benefits she is receiving, pursuant to a former marriage.
7.

That defendant be awarded the sum of $600.00 toward

her attorney's fees in lieu of the $400.00 previously recommended
by the Court Commissioner and judgment should be awarded to
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defendant for said attorney's fees.
8.

That defendant be restored to her former surname of

MUNSON.
Let judgment be entered accordingly.
DATED this

T

day of A^eilV 1990.

Stan£ot/M. Ti
District Jud
Approved as to form and content:

Phillip D. J u d ^
Attorney
fov^vefendant
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